Publications – John Worrall

Some enduring themes in my research:

1. Prediction and Accommodation

Like Lakatos, I see the justification for theory-change in the surplus predictive success of the superseding theory. But what counts as a predictive success needs careful clarification. Contrary to Lakatos’s initial view, whether or not the evidence involved was unknown at the time the new theory was first articulated is – in itself – of no significance on my account. What’s the difference between prediction and accommodation? And why does the difference matter? I developed and defended my answers in a number of papers through my career – both directly and via criticism of rival views.

[1989]:

‘Fresnel, Poisson and the White Spot: The Role of Successful Predictions in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories‘ in D. Gooding, T. Pinch & S. Schaffer (eds.) The Uses of Experiment – Studies of Experimentation in Natural Science. C.U.P., pp. 135-57. ISBN: 9780521337687.

[2001b]:

‘Prediction and the Periodic Table’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 32, pp. 407-452 (with Eric Scerri).

[2002c]:

‘New evidence for old’ in Gärdenfors, Peter, Jan Wolenski, and Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, (eds) In the scope of logic, methodology and philosophy of science: volume two of the 11th international congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, Vol. 316. Springer Science & Business Media, pp. 191-212. ISBN: 9781402009303.

[2006a]:

‘Theory-confirmation and history’. in Colin Cheyne, John Worrall (eds) In Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. pp. 31-61. ISBN: 9781402042065.

[2011]:

‘Theory conﬁrmation and novel evidence’ in Mayo, D.G. and Spanos, A. (eds), Error and inference: Recent exchanges on experimental reasoning, reliability, and the objectivity and rationality of science. Cambridge University Press, pp. 125-154. ISBN: 9780521880084..

[2011b]:

‘Underdetermination, realism and empirical equivalence’. Synthese, 180, pp. 157- 172.

[2014]:

‘Prediction and accommodation revisited’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 45, pp. 54-61.

2. Structural Realism

Following Poincaré, I defend a structural version of scientific realism as both incorporating the “no miracles intuition” and being consistent with the facts about fundamental theory-change in science. A very recent paper defends the prima facie surprising view that there is no defensible version of realism stronger than structural realism.

[1989b]:

‘Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?‘, Dialectica, 43./1-2, pp. 99-124.

[1994]:

‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the “Luminiferous Ether”‘ in M. Forbes and D. Hull (eds): PSA 1994, Volume 1. Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 334-342. ISBN: 9175863520917586379.

[2007a]:

‘Miracles and models: Why reports of the death of structural realism may be exaggerated’. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 61, pp. 125-154.

[2011a]:

‘The no miracles intuition and the no miracles argument’ in Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W.J., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T. and Weber, M. (eds) Explanation, prediction, and confirmation. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 11-21. ISBN: 978661311781.

[2011d]:

‘Miracles and structural realism’. In Landry, E. and Rickles, D. (eds), Structural realism: Structure, object, and causality (Vol. 77). Springer Science & Business Media. pp. 77-95. ISBN: 9789400725782.

[2020]:

‘Structural Realism: The On ly Defensible Realist Game in Town?’. in W.J. Gonzalez (ed), New approaches to scientific realism, De Gruyter, pp. 169-205.

3. Evidence in Medicine and Evidence-Based Medicine

It should, of course, go without saying that medicine – in particular theories about which treatments are (or are not) effective for a given condition – should be based on evidence. The interest is all in the details. I examine the detailed views of those in the Evidence-Based Medicine movement and argue that they overstate the importance of Randomised Controlled Trials and underplay the significance of ‘pathophysiologic rationale’ (i.e. knowledge of the underlying biochemistry).

[2002b]:

‘What evidence in evidence-based medicine?’ Philosophy of Science 69, no. S3 (20: pp. 316-330.

[2006]:

‘Why randomize? Evidence and ethics in clinical trials’. Contemporary perspectives in philosophy and methodology of science, pp. 65-82.

[2007]:

‘Why there’s no cause to randomize’. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, pp. 451-488.

[2007b]:

‘Evidence in medicine and evidence‐based medicine’. Philosophy Compass, 2(6), pp. 981-1022.

[2010]:

‘Do we need some large, simple randomized trials in medicine?’. Epsa Philosophical Issues in the Sciences: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 289-301.

[2010a]:

‘Evidence: philosophy of science meets medicine’. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 16(2), pp. 356-362.

[2011c]:

‘Causality in medicine: Getting back to the Hill top’. Preventive Medicine, 53(4-5), pp. 235-238.

[2022]:

‘Philosophy of Science meets Medicine (Again): a Clearer-Sighted View of the Virtues of Blinding and of Tests for Blinding in Clinical Trials’ in W,J, Gonzalez (ed) Current Trends in Philosophy of Science: a Prospective for the Near Future. Synthese Library, pp. 15-43. ISBN: 9783031013140.

[1976]:

‘Thomas Young and the “Refutation” of Newtonian Optics: A Case Study in the Interaction of Philosophy of Science and History of Science‘ in C. Howson (ed): Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, Cambridge University Press, pp. 107-179. ISBN: 9780521113083.

[1976a]:

‘Imre Lakatos (1922-1974): Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science’ in R. Cohen, P. Feyerabend and M. Wartofsky (eds): Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel, pp. 1-10. ISBN: 9789401014526.

[1978]:

‘The ways in which the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes improves on Popper’s Methodology‘ in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (eds): Progress and Rationality in Science. Reidel, pp. 45-70. ISBN: 9027709211

[1978a]:

‘Research Programmes, Empirical Support and the Duhem Problem: Replies to Criticism‘ in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (eds): Progress and Rationality in Science. Reidel, pp. 321-338. ISBN: 9027709211

[1978b]:

‘Against too much method‘, Erkenntnis, 13, pp. 279-95.

[1978c]:

‘Is the Empirical Content of a Theory Dependent on its Rivals?’, in I. Niiniluoto and R. Tuomela (eds): The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change, Acta Philosophica Fennica, XXX, pp. 175-200. ISBN: 9519505415

[1979]:

‘A Reply to David Bloor‘, The British Journal for the History of Science, 12, 1979, pp. 71-81.

[1980]:

‘Facts and Feyerabend’ in H.P. Duerr (ed): Versuchungen: Aufsätze zur Philosphie Paul Feyerabend, Suhrkamp, pp. 298-320. ISBN: 978-3518110447.

[1982]:

‘The Pressure of Light: The Strange Case of the Vacillating ‘Crucial Experiment’‘, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 13, pp. 133-71.

[1982a]:

‘Scientific Realism and Scientific Change‘, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32, pp. 201-231.

[1982b]:

‘Broken Bootstraps‘, Erkenntnis, 18, pp. 105-130.

[1984]:

‘An Unreal Image‘, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35, pp. 65-80.

[1985]:

‘Scientific Discovery and Theory-Confirmation‘, in J.Pitt (ed): Change and Progress in Modern Science, Reidel, pp. 301-331. ISBN: 9789400965270.

[1985a]:

‘The Background to the Forefront‘, in P. Asquith and P. Kitcher (eds) PSA 1984, Volume 2. Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 145-157. ISBN: 9175862120917586247

[1985b]:

‘Models versus Mathematics?’ Rendiconti della Accademia Nazionale delle Scienze detta dei XL, Serie V, Vol IX, II, pp. 121-137.

[1986]:

‘The problem of Controlling the Process of Cognition’, in O. Molden (ed.) Autonomie und Kontrolle: Steurungskrisen der Modernen Welt, pp. 315-342. OCLC: 311340383

[1988]:

‘The Value of a Fixed Methodology‘, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, pp. 263-75.

[1989]:

‘Fresnel, Poisson and the White Spot: The Role of Successful Predictions in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories‘ in D. Gooding, T. Pinch & S. Schaffer (eds.) The Uses of Experiment – Studies of Experimentation in Natural Science. C.U.P., pp. 135-57. ISBN: 9780521337687.

[1989a]:

‘Why both Popper and Watkins fail to solve the Problem of Induction‘ in F.D’Agostino and I.C. Jarvie (eds.): Freedom and Rationality: Essays in Honor of John Watkins. Reidel, pp.257-96. ISBN: 9780792302643.

[1989b]:

‘Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?‘, Dialectica, 43./1-2, pp. 99-124.

[1990]:

‘Scientific Revolutions and Scientific Rationality: The Case of the “Elderly Hold-Out”‘ in C. Wade Savage (ed.) Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press, pp. 319-354. ISBN: 9780816618019.

[1990a]:

‘Rationality, Sociology and the Symmetry Thesis‘, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4, pp. 305-19.

[1991]:

‘Feyerabend and the Facts‘ in Gonzalo Munevar (ed): Beyond Reason. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 329-353. ISBN: 9789401054065.

[1993]:

‘Falsification, Rationality and the Duhem Problem: Grünbaum vs Bayes’ in J. Earman, A.I. Janis, G.J. Massey and N. Rescher (eds): Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds. Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 329-72. ISBN: 9783879404018.

[1994]:

‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the “Luminiferous Ether”‘ in M. Forbes and D. Hull (eds): PSA 1994, Volume 1. Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 334-342. ISBN: 9175863520917586379.

[1995]:

‘Il realismo scientifico e l’etere luminifero: contro la “meta-induzione” pessimistica’ in A. Pagnini (ed.) Realismo/Antirealismo. Aspetti del Dibattito Epistemologico Contemporaneo. La Nuova Italia Editrice. Florence. pp. 167-204. ISBN: 9788822116420.

[1996]:

‘“Revolution in Permanence”: Popper on Theory-Change in Science‘ in Anthony O’Hear (ed): Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-102. ISBN: ‎9780521558150.

[1996b]:

‘Popper’s Legacy’ in H. Sasson and D.Diamond (eds): LSE on Social Science. Routledge. pp. 159-167. ISBN: 9780753007631.

[1998]:

‘Philosophy of Science’ (Signpost entry), Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

[1998a]:

‘Imre Lakatos‘, Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

[1998b]:

‘Philosophy and Natural Science’ in A.C. Grayling (ed); Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780198751793.

[1998c]:

“Realismo, racionalidad y revoluciones“, Agora, v. 17, n. 2.

[1999]:

‘Why ask “What is Disease”?’ Metascience.

[1999a]:

‘Two cheers for Naturalised Philosophy of Science’, Science and Education, 8(4), pp. 339-361.

[2000a]:

‘Kuhn, Bayes and “Theory-Choice”: How Revolutionary is Kuhn’s Account of Theoretical Change?’ in Robert Nola and Howard Sankey (eds): After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Kluwer. pp. 125-151. ISBN: 9780792360322.

[2000b]:

‘The Scope, Limits and Distinctiveness of the Method of “Deduction from the Phenomena”: Some Lessons from Newton’s “Demonstrations” in Optics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, pp. 45-80.

[2000c]:

‘Pragmatic Factors in Theory-Acceptance’ in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed): A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 349-357. ISBN: 9780631230205.

[2000d]:

‘Science, Philosophy of’, Concise Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Routledge.

[2000e]:

‘There is a Thing Called Science’, Metascience.

[2001]:

‘De la Matemática a la Ciencia: Continuidad y discontinudidad en el Pensamiento de Imre Lakatos’, en Gonzalez, W J (ed), La Filosofía de Imre Lakatos: Evaluaciōn de sus propuestas, UNED, Madrid 2001.

[2001a]:

‘Programas de investigaciōn y heurística positiva: Avance respecto de Lakatos’, en Gonzalez, W J (ed), La Filosofía de Imre Lakatos: Evaluaciōn de sus propuestas, UNED, Madrid 2001.

[2001b]:

‘Prediction and the Periodic Table’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 32, pp. 407-452 (with Eric Scerri).

[2001c]:

‘Defining Disease: Much Ado about Nothing?’ in A.-T. Tymieniecka and E. Agazzi (eds): Analectica Husserliana LXX11, pp.33-55. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001 (with Jennifer Worrall). ISBN: 9780792346777.

[2001d]:

‘Ramseyfication and Structural Realism’ Appendix IV of E. Zahar: Poincare’s Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, pp. 236-251. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 2001 (with E.G. Zahar)

[2002]:

‘Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Prospects’ P. Machamer and M. Silberstein (eds): The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, pp.18-36. Blackwell. ISBN: 9780470756614.

[2002a]:

‘”Heuristic Power” and the “Logic of Scientific Discovery”: Why MSRP is less than half the story’ in G.Kampis, L Kvasz and M. Stoeltzner (eds): Appraising Lakatos. Kluwer. ISBN: ‎978-1402002267.

[2002b]:

‘What evidence in evidence-based medicine?’ Philosophy of Science 69, no. S3 (20: pp. 316-330.

[2002c]:

‘New evidence for old’ in Gärdenfors, Peter, Jan Wolenski, and Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, (eds) In the scope of logic, methodology and philosophy of science: volume two of the 11th international congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, Vol. 316. Springer Science & Business Media, pp. 191-212. ISBN: 9781402009303.

[2003]:

‘Normal science and dogmatism, paradigms and progress: Kuhn ‘versus’ Popper and Lakatos’ in Thomas Nickles (ed): Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press, pp. 65-100. ISBN: 9780511060939.

[2003a]:

‘Lakatos in disguise’. Metascience, 12, pp.79-83.

[2004]:

‘Science discredits religion’. in Michael Peterson, and Raymond Vanarragon Contemporary debates in philosophy of religion. Blackwell, pp. 59-72. ISBN: 9786610197460.

[2005]:

‘Evidence-based vs. ‘impressionist’ medicine: how best to implement guidelines’. European heart journal, 26(22), pp. 2474-2475. (with William Fennell).

[2005a]:

‘Prediction and the ‘periodic law’: A rejoinder to Barnes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 36(4), pp. 817-826.