John Worrall

[2014]: Prediction and accommodation revisited. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 45 (1). pp. 54-61

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[2012]: “Miracles and Structural Realism”, in Landry, E., and Rickles, D., (Eds)Structural Realism: Structure, Objects and Causality, Western Ontario Series for Philosophy of Science, Reidel, pp., 77-98.

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[2011c]: ‘Causality in medicine: getting back to the Hill top’, Preventive Medicine, 53, 235-238.

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[2011b]: ‘Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence’, Synthese, 180, 157-172.

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[2011a]: ‘Error, Tests and Theory Confirmation’ in D.Mayo and A. Spanos (eds) Error and Inference.’ CUP. 125-154

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[2011]: ‘ The No Miracles Argument versus the No Miracles Intuition’ in S. Hartman (ed) Formal and Informal Methods in Philosophy of Science, Springer

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[2010c]: For universal rules, against induction. Philosophy of Science, 77 (5). pp. 740-753.

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[2010b]:  ‘Do we need some large, simple randomized trials in medicine?’ M.Suarez, M.Dorato and M. Redei (eds) EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer.

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[2010a]: ‘Evidence: Medicine meets Philosophy of Science’ Journal for the Evaluation of Clinical Practice

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[2010]: ‘Error, Tests and Theory Confirmation’ in D.Mayo and A. Spanos (eds) Error and Inference.’ CUP.

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[2009]: ‘Underdetermination, Realism and Empirical Equivalence’ Synthese, on line version

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[2008]: ‘Evidence and Ethics in Medicine’  Perspectives in Biology and Medicine.

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[2007b]:  ‘Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Volume 82, Supplement 61, October 2007, pp 125-154

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[2007a]: ‘Why There’s No Cause to Randomize’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007; 58(3):451-488

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[2007]: ‘Evidence in Medicine and Evidence-Based Medicine’, Philosophy Compass 2007

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[2006]: ‘History and Theory-Confirmation’ in J. Worrall and C. Cheyne (eds) Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Pp.31-61 Springer Publishers, 2006

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[2005b]:  J.Worrall and C.Cheyne (eds) Reason and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave. Kluwer, 2005

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[2005a]: ‘Prediction and the ‘periodic law’: a rejoinder to Barnes’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2005; 36: 817-826

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[2005]: ‘Evidence-based vs. ‘impressionist’ medicine: how best to implement guidelines’ (with W. H Fennell) European Heart Journal, November 2, 2005; 26(22): 2474-2474.

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[2004]: ‘Why Science Discredits Religion’ in M.L. Peterson and R.J. Vanarragon (eds) Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion.Blackwell

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[2003]: ‘Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn’versus’ Popper and Lakatos’ in T.Nickles (ed);: Thomas Kuhn. Cambridge University Press

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[2002d]: ‘New Evidence for Old’ in P.Gardenfors et al In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.Kluwer.

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[2002c]: “What Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine?”  Philosophy of Science. September 2002

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[2002b]: ‘”Heuristic Power” and the “Logic of Scientific Discovery”: Why MSRP is less than half the story’ in G.Kampis, L Kvasz and M. Stoeltzner (eds) Appraising Lakatos. Kluwer. 2002. ISBN 1-4020-0226-2

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[2002a]:  “Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Prospects” P. Machamer and M. Silberstein (eds) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science , pp18-36.  Blackwell, 2002 ISBN 0-631-22107-7 (hardback) 0-631-22108-5 (paperback)

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[2001d]: “Ramseyfication and Structural Realism” Appendix  IV of E. Zahar: Poincare’s Philosophy: From Conventionalism to Phenomenology, pp 236-251. Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 2001

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[2001c]: “ Defining Disease: Much Ado about Nothing?” in A.-T. Tymieniecka and E. Agazzi (eds): Analectica Husserliana LXX11, pp33-55. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001 (with Dr J.G. Worrall)

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[2001b]: “Prediction and the Periodic Table” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 32, pp407-452, 2001 (with Eric Scerri)

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[2001a]: “Programas de investigaciōn y heurística positiva: Avance respecto de Lakatos”, en Gonzalez, W J (ed), La Filosofía de Imre Lakatos: Evaluaciōn de sus propuestas, UNED, Madrid 2001

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[2001]: “De la Matemática a la Ciencia: Continuidad y discontinudidad en el Pensamiento de Imre Lakatos”, en Gonzalez, W J (ed), La Filosofía de Imre Lakatos: Evaluaciōn de sus propuestas, UNED, Madrid 2001

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[2000e]: “There is a Thing Called Science”, Metascience, June 2000

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[2000d]: ‘Science, Philosophy of’, Concise Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Routledge

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[2000c]: ‘Pragmatic Factors in Theory-Acceptance’ in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp.349-357

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[2000b]: ‘The Scope, Limits and Distinctiveness of the Method of “Deduction from the Phenomena”: Some Lessons from Newton’s “Demonstrations” in Optics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, pp. 45-80

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[2000a]: ‘Kuhn, Bayes and “            Theory-Choice”:How Revolutionary is Kuhn’s Account of Theoretical Change?’ in Robert Nola and Howard Sankey (eds): After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Kluwer. pp 125-151

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[1999a]: ‘Two cheers for Naturalised Philosophy of Science’, Science and Education, July 1999

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[1999]: ‘Why ask “What is Disease”?’ Metascience, March 1999

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[1998c]: “Realismo, racionalidad y revoluciones”, Agora, v. 17, n. 2..

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[1998b]: ‘Philosophy and Natural Science’ in A.C. Grayling (ed); Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. Oxford University Press.

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[1998a]: ‘Imre Lakatos’,  Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

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[1998]: ‘Philosophy of Science’ (Signpost entry), Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

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[1996c]: ‘Popper’s Legacy’ in H. Sasson and D.Diamond (eds): LSE on Social Science.  Routledge. pp. 159-167.

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[1996b]: ‘Is the Idea of Scientific Explanation Unduly Anthropocentric?  The Lessons of the Anthropic Principle’ Centre for Philosophy of Natural  and Social Science, Discussion Paper Series

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[1996a]: ‘Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?’ in David Papineau (ed.): Scientific Realism. Oxford Readings in Philosophy, pp.139-165 (Reprint of  [1989b])

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[1996]: ‘”Revolution in Permanence”:  Popper on Theory-Change in Science’ in Anthony O’Hear (ed): Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems.  Cambridge University Press. pp. 75-102

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[1995]: ‘Il realismo scientifico e l’etere luminifero: contro la “meta-induzione” pessimistica’ in A. Pagnini (ed.) Realismo /Antirealismo. Aspetti del Dibattito Epistemologico Contemporaneo.  La Nuova Italia Editrice. Florence.  pp.167-204

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[1994]: ‘How to Remain (Reasonably) Optimistic: Scientific Realism and the “Luminiferous Ether”‘ in M.Forbes and D.Hull (eds): PSA 1994, Volume 1. Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 334-342.

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[1993]: ‘Falsification, Rationality and the Duhem Problem: Grünbaum vs Bayes’ in J.Earman, A.I.Janis, G.J.Massey and N.Rescher (eds): Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds. Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of  Pittsburgh Press, pp329-72.

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[1991]: ‘Feyerabend and the Facts’ in Gonzalo Munevar (ed): Beyond Reason. Dordrecht:  Kluwer, pp.329-353.

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[1990a]: ‘Rationality, Sociology and the Symmetry Thesis’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 4, 305-19

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[1990]: ‘Scientific Revolutions and Scientific Rationality:  The Case of the “Elderly Hold-Out”‘ in C. Wade Savage (ed.)  Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press, pp.319-354.

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[1989c]: ‘Fix it and be Damned’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40, 376-88

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[1989b]: ‘Structural Realism: the Best of Both Worlds?’, Dialectica, 43./1-2, 99-124.

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[1989a]: ‘Why both Popper and Watkins fail to solve the Problem of Induction’ in F.D’Agostino and I.C. Jarvie (eds.):  Freedom and Rationality:  Essays in  Honor of John Watkins.  Reidel, pp.257-96.

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[1989]: ‘Fresnel, Poisson and the White Spot: The Role of Successful Predictions in the Acceptance of Scientific Theories’  in D. Gooding, T. Pinch & S. Schaffer (eds.)  The Uses of Experiment – Studies of Experimentation in Natural Science.   C.U.P., pp.135-57.

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[1988]: ‘The Value of a Fixed Methodology’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, 263-75.

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[1986]: ‘The problem of Controlling the Process of Cognition’, in O. Molden (ed.) Autonomie und Kontrolle:  Steurungskrisen der Modernen Welt, pp. 315-342.

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[1986]: ‘Models versus Mathematics?’ Rendiconti della Accademia Nazionale delle Scienze detta dei XL, Serie V, Vol IX, II, 121-137

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[1985a]: ‘The Background to the Forefront’, in P. Asquith and P. Kitcher (eds) PSA 1984, Volume 2. Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 145- 157.

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[1985]: ‘Scientific Discovery and Theory-Confirmation’, in J.Pitt (ed): Change and Progess in Modern Science, Reidel, pp. 301-331.

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[1984]: ‘An Unreal Image’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35, 65-80.

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[1982b]: ‘Broken Bootstraps’, Erkenntnis, 18, 105-130.

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[1982a]: ‘Scientific Realism and Scientific Change’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 201-231.

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[1982]: ‘The Pressure of Light:  The Strange Case of the Vacillating ‘Crucial Experiment”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 13, 133-71.

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[1980]: ‘Facts and Feyerabend’ in H.P. Duerr (ed): Versuchungen:  Aufsätze zur Philosphie Paul Feyerabend, Suhrkamp, pp. 298-320.

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[1979]: ‘A Reply to David Bloor’, The British Journal for the History of Science, 12, 1979, 71-81.

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[1978c]: ‘Is the Empirical Content of a Theory Dependent on its Rivals?’, in I. Niiniluoto and R. Tuomela (eds):  The Logic  and Epistemology of Scientific Change,  Acta Philosophica Fennica, XXX, 175-200.

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[1978b]: ‘Against too much method’, Erkenntnis, 13, 279-95.

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[1978a]:  ‘Research Programmes, Empirical Support and the Duhem Problem:  Replies to Criticism’ in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (eds):  Progress and Rationality in Science.  Reidel, pp.321-338.

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[1978]: ‘The ways in which the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes improves on Popper’s Methodology’ in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (eds): Progess and Rationality in Science.  Reidel, pp. 45-70.

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[1976a]: ‘Imre Lakatos (1922-1974): Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science’ in R. Cohen, P. Feyerabend and M. Wartofsky (eds): Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel, pp.1-10.

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[1976]:  ‘Thomas Young and the “Refutation” of Newtonian Optics:  A Case Study in the Interaction of Philosphy of Science and History of Science’ in C. Howson (ed): Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, Cambridge University Press, pp. 107-179.

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